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Abstract: In 2004, the term « Radical Right Gender Gap » was coined to capture the 
greater reluctance of women to vote for these parties in Europe (Givens, 2004). 
Several lines of explanation were put forward: women were more educated, less 
exposed by the types of jobs they held to competition with immigrants, less 
supportive of political violence and extremism, more religious, etc.. Yet systematic 
analysis of survey data shows large variations in the gap from one country to another 
(Immerzeel, Coffé and van der Lippe, 2013). In addition, even where this gap existed, 
things might be changing (Barisione and Mayer, 2013), as Radical Right Parties 
present themselves as women friendly and target Islam and Muslims in the name of 
democratic values and women’s rights (Akkerman and Haggelund, 2007; de Lange 
and Mügge, 2015). Using the 2014 European Election Studies dataset, this paper 
revisits the RRGG in a comparative perspective, analyzing gender as a predictor of 
vote choice for Radical Right Parties in Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, 
Netherlands and Sweden. While the gender gap persists once controlled for education, 
age, religion and occupation, the interaction of gender with political attitudes and left-
right ideology significantly affects electoral support for RR parties in the six cases 
studied. And the RRGG appears tightly entangled with the “traditional gender gap” on 
the one side and the “modern gender-generation gap” on the other.  
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Introduction  
 
Since the pioneer insight of Hans Georg Betz (1994) a large body of literature has 
tried to explain the unequal support of men and women for the Populist Radical 
Rights that have developed in Europe since the 1980s - or “Radical Right Gender 
Gap” (Givens, 2004; Norris, 2005; Rippeyoung, 2007; Mudde, 2007 ; Immerzeel et 
al., 2013; de Bruijn, Veenbrink, 2012; Coffé, 2013)1. However until recently few 
studies had attempted a systematic study of the RRGG, controlling for the possible 
effect of other variables. Those who did show large variations in the gap from one 
country to another (Immerzeel, Coffé and van der Lippe, 2013). In addition, even 
where this gap existed, things might be changing (Barisione and Mayer, 2013), at a 
time when Radical Right Parties increasingly present themselves as women friendly, 
targeting Islam and Muslims in the name of democratic values and women’s rights 
(Akkerman and Haggelund, 2007; de Lange and Mügge, 2015). In France for 
instance, while gender had a significant impact on the votes for Jean-Marie Le Pen, it 
had none on the votes for his daughter in the 2012 presidential election, once 
controlled by age, education, religious practice, occupation and left right position 
(Mayer, 2013a and 2013b). Therefore this paper proposes a re-examination of the 
impact of gender on voting in the 2014 EP (European Parliament) Election.  
 
A first section revisits the literature about the successive electoral gender gaps 
through recent decades. A second one presents our research strategy and 
methodology. A third one tests our hypotheses, using data from the 2014 European 
Election Studies in Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Netherlands, and Sweden.  
 
 
1. Theoretical framework: revisiting the electoral gender gap(s) 
 
1.1. From traditional to modern gender gap 
The term “gender gap” was coined in the US by the National Organization of Women 
(NOW) at the time of the election of Ronald Reagan. In the 1980 American 
presidential race, for the first time since they got the right to vote, women gave more 
support to the Democrats. Since then this gap has persisted, and there is a robust 
relation between gender and vote, still significant after controlling for age, class, race 
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and religion (Manza and Brooks 1998; Whitaker, 2008; Abendschön and Steinmetz, 
2014). A similar divide has appeared since in several post industrial democracies, and 
notably in Europe (Inglehart, Norris, 2003; Mossuz-Lavau and Le Hay, 2010; Giger, 
2009), women moving more to the left than men whatever the indicator used. It was 
called the “modern gender gap”, in opposition to the previous “traditional” one. 
Women in most countries got the right to vote long after men. They first tended to be 
more conservative, and give more support than men to right wing parties with a 
traditional view of women’s role and family (Mossuz-Lavau and Sineau, 1983). Their 
progressive dealignment from the right and realignment towards the left, according to 
the developmental theories framed by Inglehart and Norris (1999), reflects structural 
and cultural changes occurring in most post industrial societies after World War 2. 
Women’s rising level of education and their massive entrance in the labour market on 
the one hand, the process of secularization, the break-up of traditional family units, 
and the emancipating influence of post-materialist values and feminist movements  - 
encouraging autonomy and self expression - on the other hand, brought them 
gradually closer to left-wing parties. This was particularly the case among the 
younger generations, leading Pippa Norris to coin the term of “generation gender 
gap” (Norris, 1996). In the long run, generational replacement should even expand the 
process: “If a generational rather than a life-cycle effect, as seems most likely, this 
suggests that the process of generational turnover will probably continue to move 
women leftwards. In the long-term, as younger voters gradually replace older 
generations, through secular turnover, the modern gender gap should therefore 
strengthen and consolidate in established democracies. “(Inglehart and Norris, 2000, 
p.  459).  
 
1.2. The emergence of a Radical Right Gender Gap 
Since the 1980s though, the electoral boom of radical right anti immigrant parties, 
especially in Europe, has brought about a third cleavage, women appearing more 
reluctant to give their votes to these parties. Hans-Georg Betz was the first to outline 
the phenomenon (Betz, 1994, p.142-148), and the difference seems to persist (Givens, 
2004; Norris, 2005; Immerzeel et al., 2013; de Bruijn and Veenbrink, 2012). Both 
structural and attitudinal factors have been put forward to account for what has 
become known as the “Radical Right Gender Gap” (Givens, 2004).  
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A first line of argument considers the gendered division of labour (Mayer, 2002; 
Givens, 2004; Rippeyoung, 2007; Studlar et al., 1998). Men are still overrepresented 
in manual occupations, particularly among industrial blue collars (ouvriers), the 
“globalization losers” by excellence. In competition with cheap labour in developing 
countries on the one side and with immigrants inside the country on the other, they 
are the most likely to support the Radical Right (Betz 1994; Kitschelt and McGann, 
1995; Kriesi et al. 2008; Oesch, 2008; Bornschier and Kriesi, 2012). Conversely, 
women are more often employed in non-manual clerical or services jobs and in the 
public sector, and hold on the whole economically more secure positions and less 
exposed to immigration. Therefore they should be less inclined to turn to the Radical 
Right.  
 
A second line of research stresses the greater religiosity of women. Christian 
Churches all over Europe have repeatedly condemned the anti-immigrant and 
inegalitarian message of the Radical Rights in the name of the Evangels. Although a 
process of secularization is taking place in post-industrial European societies, women, 
especially the elderly, still attend religious services more often than men. They should 
therefore be more likely to hear the warnings of the Church. Sineau (2004, p.220) has 
showed that in Catholic France, not only women go to church more often than men, 
they are also more receptive to the Christian message. At similar level of religious 
practice than men, they were far less inclined to vote for Jean-Marie Le Pen in the 
2002 Presidential election, the gap reaching its peak among elderly women that were 
catholic and regular church-goers. These remnants of the “traditional gender gap” 
could explain the RRGG of today.  
 
A third block of research, more in line with the modern gender gap perspective, points 
on the contrary to the gradual diffusion of feminist ideas at all levels of society - a 
“rising tide” (Inglehart  and Norris, 2003).  This could prevent women, especially the 
new highly educated generations, from supporting far right parties that defend a 
traditional ideology, reducing them to their role of spouses and mothers. Conversely, 
the very spread of feminist ideas, the claims for equality and the growing presence of 
women in the work force could be seen as a threat for masculine supremacy, breeding 
insecurity and resentment and feeding an authoritarian anti-feminist vote for the far 
right (Perrineau, 1997). This is even more likely in working class and blue collars 
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milieus, where norms of strong manhood and masculinity, based on physical strength, 
still predominate (Frader, 2008; Molinier, 2004).  
 
A last line of research stresses the persistence of gender stereotypes from early 
socialisation and their impact in the political realm (Mossuz-Lavau, 2014; Huddy and 
Terkildsen, 1993; Lahire, 2001). Girls are still brought up differently than boys, 
expected not to be violent or aggressive. Women in surveys, for instance, appear 
systematically less in favour of war and conflict 2. The image of extremism associated 
to Radical Right Parties could be a deterrent factor for them. Women are also less 
trained to assert themselves, to confront disagreement or question social norms 
(Immerzeel, Coffé, van der Lippe, 2013). One of the main finding of a study based on 
three waves of the CSES data in 32 countries shows that men are politically more 
“assertive” than women, more likely to cast a vote for new or ambiguous parties, 
whatever their political stands: “the more other respondents indicated to highly dislike 
the party, the smaller the relative share of female voters” (Harteveld and al., 2013; 
p.12; also see Immerzeel et al., 2013).  
 
1.3. Beyond the “Radical Right Gender Gap” approach 
That having been said, one may ask if the different explanations put forward to 
explain the RRGG are still relevant today, in a context of economic recession and 
political disaffection. Indeed, new conditions potentially favoring a shift toward the 
opposite direction, i.e. an erosion of the RRGG, could easily be identified.	  Since	   2008,	   the	   deteriorating	   economic	   situation	   is	   blurring	   the	   bordure	  between	   manual	   and	   non-­‐manual	   positions,	   with	   both	   white-­‐collar	   women	   in	  service	   jobs	   and	   blue-­‐collar	   men	   in	   manufacturing	   jobs	   being	   increasingly	  exposed	   to	   part	   time	   and	   low	   paid	   insecure	   positions.	   As	   a	   consequence,	  women’s	  level	  of	  support	  for	  the	  Radical	  Right	  should	  come	  closer	  to	  men’s3.	  In	  addition,	  religion	  could	  work	  less	  as	  a	  protection	  against	  intolerance	  and	  feed,	  on	  the	   contrary,	   anti-­‐Muslim	   and	   anti-­‐minorities’	   resentment	   in	   a	   context	   of	   anti-­‐Muslim	  polarization.	  A	  similar	  backlash	  trend	  may	  concern	  feminist	  attitudes.	  As	  a	  belief	  in	  equality	  between	  men	  and	  women,	  feminism	  should	  less	  clearly	  deter	  women	   from	   supporting	   Radical	   Right	   Parties,	   which	   are	   gendering	   the	  immigration	   issue	   and	   presenting	   Islam	   as	   a	   threat	   to	  women’s	   rights.	   Finally,	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the	  ideologically	  less	  extreme	  and	  thus	  more	  acceptable	  image	  given	  by	  some	  of	  these	   Radical	   Rights	   could	  weaken	   the	   reluctance	   of	   female	   voters	   to	   vote	   for	  them. Hence, the RRGG might well be in transition, with forces pulling in different 
directions.  
 
One may even go further, considering that the exclusive focus on the latest research 
on the “RRGG” and its size are more an obstacle than a help to understand what 
gender does to electoral behavior. Indeed, the emergence of a RRGG does not 
necessarily mean that the two previous electoral gaps have disappeared; they need to 
be articulated together. Moreover, what matters is not just the size of the gap, but the 
level of support for RR. The fact that there is no radical right gender gap left could 
have two opposite meanings: that women give the same high support to RR than men 
or, conversely, that they show the same rejection of these parties. Similarly, the same 
gap in size can have totally different meanings. Our assumption, in line with Sineau’s 
finding, is that two types of women can be less willing than men to vote for the 
radical right for opposite reasons. In certain parts of the electorate, this will reflect a 
modern gender gap, with young educated women being ideologically more 
progressive and left-wing than men, thus more reluctant to support RR. In other parts, 
a traditional gender gap may subsist, with elderly, religious women being more prone 
than men to support conservative mainstream parties rather than the extreme right. 
  
This implies that one should explore more closely the specific interactions between 
gender and the other variables that explain support for the radical right: age, 
education, occupation, religion, left-right position and social attitudes (especially 
relative to immigration and feminism/post materialism), and see how gender gaps –in 
the plural – appear, disappear or overlap.  
 
1.4. Theoretical expectations  
In this paper, due not only to limitations of space but also in the number of variables 
available in the 2014 EES dataset, we focus on a specific set of expectations arising 
from our theoretical framework, which combines – as suggested above – 
presence/absence of the RRGG with high/low levels of support for the radical right. 
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In addition, we are interested in disentangling “traditional” and “modern” forms of 
radical right gender gap.  
 
The framework presented below precisely combines levels of gender gap 
(yes=significant; no= absent or statistically non significant) with levels of support for 
radical right parties (yes=highest; no=lowest). This four-cell table enables us to 
differentiate between cases of inter-gender “equal rejection” (no Gender Gap and no 
Radical Right support) and “equal support” (high RR score with no GG) on the one 
side; between cases of “traditional” gap in radical right support (high RR score, 
especially among men voters) and “modern” patterns of rejection of the RR (women 
scoring particularly low) on the other side. Within this bi-dimensional framework for 
analysis of the radical right gender gap, the conventional concern about the magnitude 
of this gap is only a starting point – a broad picture that necessitates zooming in 
further into the complexities of this topic. 
 
As for this “broad picture”, we expect  - given the contradictory trends outlined in the 
previous section - to find only a mild gender gap in our overall measure of support for 
radical right parties in the six countries considered. We also anticipate that this gap 
should be reduced further, if not entirely suppressed, when introducing controls for 
the main sociological variables – especially education and religiosity – due to 
compositional gender differences along these societal lines. Finally, more general 
ideological orientations (such as left-right self-placement) and social attitudes (e.g. 
toward immigrants) should result as the fundamental “mediators” of support for 
radical right parties, i.e. the radical right gender gap should disappear when holding 
these factors equal across gender. 
 
After investigating this general pattern, however, we will move on to consider more 
specific interactions of gender with a set of theoretically relevant variables, which 
might act as “moderators” of the radical right gender gap4. Indeed, we argue that the 
issue of gender heterogeneity – i.e. women and men voters being considered not as 
homogenous blocs but in their intra-group differentiations – is too often neglected in 
the study of political gender gaps in general, and of the radical right gender gap in 
particular. Yet we know from scholarly literature that two gender-based mechanisms 
might coexist and drive the overall RRGG: the first one implies that a category of 
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women present, both in social and ideological terms, all the typical features of RR 
voters but actually tend to vote less for these parties than men, possibly due to their 
lower political “assertiveness”. This category of women would thereby reflect the 
idea of a “traditional gender gap”, with higher support for mainstream right-wing 
parties and lower support for radical right parties. We expect to find evidence of this 
mechanism possibly among elder and more religious women, and even more clearly 
among those with conservative ideology and less tolerant attitudes toward social 
outgroups.  
 
The second mechanism points, on the contrary, to the importance of a category of 
women with social and political profiles completely averse to the radical right, and 
which we would expect to reject RR parties even more strongly than men. This 
expectation is based on the notion of a “modern gender gap” resting on new 
generations of highly educated women characterized by culturally more liberal and 
politically more progressive attitudes. Alongside a “modern” pattern of greater 
women’ rejection of the radical right, we might also find evidence of “equal 
rejection” across similar categories of women and men voters. Finally, social 
economic insecurity aggravated by the economic crisis exposes	  women	   in	   service	  jobs	   as	  well	   as	   blue-­‐collar	  men	   to	  unemployment,	   part	   time	   jobs	   and	   low	  paid	  insecure	  jobs.	  This	  should	  bring	  women,	  especially	  those	  already	  excluded from 
labour force, close	  to	  men	  in	  their	  level	  of	  support	  for	  the	  Radical	  Right.  
 
 
Theoretical framework: Gender Gap (GG) and Radical Right support (RR) 
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Hence, our set of theoretical expectations transcends – as suggested above – the mere 
issue of the overall magnitude of the radical right gender gap and aims to attain a 
more fine-grained comprehension of the phenomenon in its multiple dimensions. 
 
Although our main interest lies in radical right parties as a relatively homogenous 
ideological family, we are not assuming cross-country homogeneity in patterns of 
Radical Right Gender Gap. Not only do general levels of support of RR parties differ 
across countries, but also the gender gap itself could differ across countries, especially 
depending on whether or not the RR party has pursued a strategy of normalization in 
the national political arena. To the extent that a normalization strategy – such as that 
pursued by National Front, Party of Freedom, FPÖ, and Danish People’s Party – 
makes the RR more socially acceptable and less perceived as an ideological 
“outsider”, women might come to present roughly the same support as men for RR 
parties. Of course, results concerning this last hypothesis will be suggestive at best, 
given the very limited number of national cases selected for this study.  
 
 
2. Data and Method 
 
A special attention will be given to methodological issues. Indeed, very few studies 
attempt a systematic analysis of the RRGG. Some just acknowledge the gap based on 
cross tabulations comparing the level of electoral support of these parties by gender 
and by country, sometimes only at one point in time, not controlling for the possible 
effect of other variables. When they do attempt systematic controls (for instance 
Immerzeel, Coffé, and van der Lippe, 2013; Norris, 2005; Rippeyoung, 2007), it is 
usually on the basis of large cross-national surveys (European Values Study, 
European Social Survey, World Values Survey) that are not fit to such a purpose and 
result into a distorted image of actual votes for such parties. The reason for this is the 
non-electoral nature of these surveys, which collect voting intentions or past votes in 
the next or last national election, but outside the context of a real election (Banducci 
and Stevens, 2015). Moreover, the country subsamples are usually small, resulting 
into very small numbers of self-reported far-right voters, a tendency that is further 
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aggravated by moral reprobation being still attached to support for many of these 
parties.  
 
Therefore our choice went to the European Election Studies, and for the most recent 
election, 2014, all the more interesting to study as the Radical Rights did very good 
scores (over one quarter for the Danish People’s Party, the French FN, the British 
UKIP). We chose to limit ourselves to six well-established “radical right populist 
parties”5 in Europe that are clearly positioned on the right side of a 0-10 left-right 
scale by public opinions in their countries. We excluded other potentially relevant 
parties that are less congruent with a radical right ideology, such as the Northern 
League and True Finns. We excluded Eastern Europe countries as well, because of the 
specificity of the post-communist context. The selection of cases presents contrasted 
features, in that the scores of these parties in the EP election range between 26.6 
percent for the Danish People’s Party to 4.3 for the Flemish Interest (see Appendix 
table 1). Some of these parties are also perceived as more extremist than others. If one 
compares their average score on an 11-point left-right scale (0-10), the French FN 
comes ahead with a peak score of 8.8, while the Danish People’s Party gets only 7.4 
(see Appendix table 2). 
 
However, in spite of their relative differences, these six parties undoubtedly belong to 
the same line of the “Radical Right” in contemporary Europe (2015, Kallis) and are 
suitable, as such, for an aggregate study of the radical right gender gap. Hence, this 
study aims to test and explain the European radical right gender gap altogether – i.e. 
with a ‘pooled’ approach – rather than to seize ‘in-country’ specificities. For this 
reason, our methodological strategy consists of constructing a single measure of 
support for radical right parties across the six countries, i.e. a unique dependent 
variable resulting from the aggregation of voting probabilities for each national party. 
 
Lastly, we opted for voting probabilities rather than for actual votes, since even in 
specifically comparative electoral surveys like the EES (European Election Studies), 
the number of self-reported radical right voters is often too small to permit any 
statistical analysis. In this 2014 EES survey, for instance, in spite of the high score of 
the National Front at the EP election (25%), the number of self-reported NF voters 
amounts to 58 (16%, see Appendix table 1).  
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Therefore, to properly analyze the RR gender gap and its relationship with other 
social and political factors it is safer to turn to a continuous measure of party support 
such as the propensity to vote (PTV) score. This variable indicates the self-assessed 
degree of probability (on a 0-10 scale) that each respondent “will ever vote” for a RR 
party, where ‘0’ means “not at all probable” and ‘10’ means “very probable”. Using 
this variable, the number of respondents for each RR party increases from a minimum 
of 580 (Vlaams Belang) to a maximum of 1114 cases (Sweden Democrats) (see 
Appendix table 3). 
 
Not only does this variable present the clear advantage of a much larger number of 
cases, it also proves to be a very good proxy for real vote choices. We draw this 
conclusion from two statistical tests. First, appendix table 3 presents the average PTV 
score by vote choice at the 2014 EP election (RR party voters vs. other voters). In all 
cases, propensities to vote for RR parties always exceed the average score ‘8’ on the 
0-10 scale among RR party voters, with a clear homogeneity across countries. 
Secondly, we test the measure of association between the two variables (vote choice 
and propensities to vote for a RR party) using an ANOVA. Both their overall 
correlation (eta= .737) and effect size (eta squared = .542) prove very strong. 
Therefore, voting probabilities as collected in an immediate post-election context 
provide an excellent piece of information about the behavioral propensities of each 
respondent.  
 
As shown in Appendix figure 1, most respondents will give the radical right party the 
score ‘0’ – almost 60% overall, which corresponds to the portion of those who do not 
vote, and do not consider to do it, for a radical right party. But the presence of a 
continuous scale prevents from losing important information about: (1) radical right 
voters who did not turn out at a “second-order election” such as the EP election (Reif 
and Schmitt, 1980; Hix and Marsh, 2011); (2) actual or would-be radical right voters 
who are not declaring their vote choice due to a “social desirability” bias (Holbrook 
and Krosnick, 2010).  
 
Using a stacked data matrix, we thus create a new “PTV” variable, which measures 
propensities to vote for the six parties altogether. To account for the country-level 
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differences, we use a mixed effect multilevel method in which individual respondents 
represent level 1 and their country level 2. Our multilevel models include random (or 
varying) intercepts and slopes, because we assume not only that average levels of 
support for radical right parties vary significantly across countries, but also that 
gender differently predicts radical right support in different countries.  
 
 
3. Results  
 
3.1. The broad picture: multilevel regression models predicting the radical right 
gender gap 
Our first hypothesis concerns the presence, magnitude and direction of a gender gap 
in the support of radical right parties at the 2014 EP election. As anticipated, we 
expect to find only a mild gender gap referencing higher male support for the 
European radical right, and this gender gap to possibly disappear after controlling for 
a set of key ‘sociological’ variables – namely education and religiosity. 
 
Table 1 shows patterns of RRGG (Radical Right Gender Gap) in the six countries 
altogether, across different multilevel models that include varying sets of control 
variables: model 0 (or “Basic”, i.e. with only gender as an independent variable and 
no other controls); model 1 (“Societal”, with age, education and religiosity as 
controls); model 3 (“Political”, which includes the respondents’ participation in the 
2014 EP election, their degree of political interest and their left-right self-placement); 
model 4 (“Policy-related”, which adds two more variables tapping respondents’ 
orientations toward two key issues in radical right parties’ platforms and discourses, 
namely immigration and same-sex marriage).6 
 
As the coefficient for gender in model 0 shows, there is a fully significant gender gap 
in favor of higher male support for the six European radical right parties altogether. 
Since the independent variable is dichotomous (male vs. female), interpretation of the 
coefficient is straightforward: the average PTV score (our measure of support for 
radical right parties on a 0-10 scale) is, on average, 0.46 points lower among women. 
While this gender gap is statistically fully significant, however, in substantive terms it 
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also looks relatively mild:  if translated in percentage terms, it amounts to a gap of 
less than 5 percentage points between men and women voters.  
 
The second important result comes from model 1, which reveals that the radical right 
gender gap is virtually unaffected by potential compositional gender differences in 
terms of education and religiosity. Of course, both control variables do exert an 
impact on radical right support, as well as age does. It is among younger, low-
educated voters who do not often attend religious services that the propensities to vote 
for radical right parties are relatively higher. But even taking this into account, 
women continue to appear more reluctant than men to support these parties. As a 
result, our starting hypothesis is only partially confirmed: the RRGP is substantively 
mild, but it fails to decrease when controls by education and religiosity are 
introduced.  
 
*** Table 1 here *** 
 
Model 2 goes further in testing the socio-political bases of the radical right gender 
gap. To do so, it investigates whether the RRGG depends on different gender 
compositions in terms of actual turnout at the 2014 EP election, of political interest 
and of distribution on the left-right ideological axis. While participation in the 
European election makes a barely significant difference on the support of the radical 
right (which slightly tends to decrease among actual voters in 2014), a more important 
role is played by political interest (the higher the interest in politics, the lower the 
chances to vote for a radical right party) and, much expectedly, by left-right self-
placement: as the latter gets closer to the far-right pole by one unit, the average PTV 
score increases by more than 0.4 points, all else being held constant. But even in this 
case – including these political control variables – the radical right gender gap 
remains fully significant, even though substantively reduced (from 0.46 to 0.33 
average points).  
 
It is only when the policy-related dimension of radical right voting –
agreement/disagreement with restrictive migration policies and with same-sex 
marriage (model 3) – are entered in addition to left-right position that the gender gap 
loses any residual significance. This implies that men are more prone to vote for the 
	  14	  
radical right partly because they are, on average, in 2014, more right wing-oriented 
than women, but also slightly more restrictive than women on migration policies, as 
well as clearly more conservative on gender-related issues such as same-sex 
marriages. Hence, while there is no evidence of a compositional basis of the RRGG in 
societal terms – i.e. it is not because they are, on average, more religious that women 
vote less for the radical right (and education levels do not differ, overall) – we do find 
evidence of a compositional effect in terms of ideology and policy orientations across 
gender. Men’s greater inclination to voting for RR parties, in other words, is partly 
mediated by their more radical-right oriented political attitudes (see histograms in 
following figures 4, 5a and 5b). In the next section, we will analyze intra-gender 
variations in the relationship between ideology and voting, i.e. whether ideology 
moderates propensities to vote for the radical right across gender. 
 
*** Figure 1 here *** 
 
Figure 1 shows the same results (magnitude of RRGG by each model) across 
countries. Patterns of gender gap do change, of course, across countries. In the basic 
model, the gap is of about 0.6 points in France and Denmark, but it dos not reach 0.4 
points in Sweden and Belgium. Moreover, decrease of the gender gap in the support 
of the National Front is linear as we proceed from model 0 to model 3, whereas the 
pattern appears to be “flatter” for other countries.  
 
However, the broad picture is fundamentally the same across countries: a mild radical 
right gender gap, which is not affected by social/compositional control factors but 
tends to disappear when introducing left-right ideology and attitudes toward social 
outgroup-related policies. Hence, the hypothesis that the degree of normalization and 
gender friendliness of these parties matters does not hold, as the gender gap is not 
higher in Flanders where such a normalization strategy is not much developed, while 
it persists in Denmark where the People’s Party has definitely made an effort to 
gender the immigration issue.  
 
3.2. Going further: interaction effects of gender in the support for the European 
radical right 
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If women still are, on average, slightly less prone to support European radical right 
parties than men, is this gap amplified or, conversely, suppressed within certain 
categories of women by socio-occupational and ideological lines? Our second set of 
hypotheses posits the existence of significant interactions between gender and other 
variables that are, as shown in section 1, crucial to explaining electoral support for 
radical right parties. Moreover, we expect not only the magnitude, but also the 
meaning of the radical right gender gap to vary across categories of voters, given that 
no gender gap, for instance, can imply men and women equally supporting or, on the 
contrary, equally rejecting radical right parties.  
 
Following the framework presented in our “four-cell table”, we estimate five different 
interaction models based on mixed-effect multilevel regression model 1 (societal), as 
shown in equations 1-5 (see Appendix A). For each model, we will not present all 
parameter estimates for every interaction term and control variable included, but just 
the specific marginal effects of gender resulting from the interaction model, i.e. the 
statistically most meaningful results (Brambor, Clark and Golder, 2006).  
 
Figure 2 presents marginal effects of low vs. high education levels on the RRGG. We 
find no significant gender gap at low education levels but a clear gender gap (0.8, i.e. 
significantly higher than the average value of 0.45 drawn from Table 1) at high 
education levels. These two gaps conceal however different average levels of RR 
support. Among the less educated respondents, PTV scores are significantly higher 
than average (3.4 for men, 3.0 for women, 2.3 the overall average); among the more 
educated, while scores reflect the average value among men (2.2), they reach their 
lowest level among women (1.4). In other words, what we find here is a pattern of 
“modern rejection”, with educated women presenting – as in the more general case of 
the “modern gender gap” – more progressive, less conservative political attitudes.  
 
***Figures 2 and 3 here*** 
 
While levels of religiosity do not appear to significantly affect gender patterns of 
radical right support (in both cases, the PTV scores decrease at highest levels of 
religiosity – figure not reported), social economic insecurity and exclusion from 
labour force does seem to alter the gender balance in this respect. In the 2014 EES 
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questionnaires, our best proxies are such occupational conditions as “manual worker” 
(whether skilled or unskilled) and “non active” out of work respondents (i.e. home-
maker, unemployed or temporarily not working). We thus isolate these two 
employment statuses from the rest of the sample (“Else”). 
 
Figure 3 shows that the gender gap is neutralized, and tends even to be reversed, 
among non-actives (value above the zero line indicates women supporting the RR 
more than men, although the gap is not statistically significant here), whereas it is 
reinforced among manual workers (1.0). In both cases, however, women’s support for 
the radical right is higher than their average score (2.1) (the score among non-active 
women is 2.7, among manual works 2.8). But it is among non-actives that women’s 
position appears most noteworthy, firstly because they even tend to score higher then 
men, secondly because they account for two thirds of this occupational category. 
Among manual workers, on the contrary, men are not only more numerous (68%), but 
also much more strongly supporting the radical right (3.8). As mentioned in section 1, 
this could be associated with norms of masculinity permeating blue collars milieus 
and reflecting an  “angry white men” basis for RR support. 
 
Overall, non-active workers provide an excellent example of “equal support” across 
gender, i.e. RR support with no gender gap. Manual workers, on the contrary, fit the 
cell of “traditional support”, or traditional gender gap in support for radical right 
parties.  
 
***Figure 4 here*** 
 
If the societal dimension matters in this respect, intra-gender variations of the RRGG 
also depend on ideological and policy-related factors. Table 1 has already shown that 
the latter are strongly associated with voting for radical right parties, but also that they 
partly mediate the radical right gender gap, which disappears when gender 
compositional differences in terms of left-right ideology, attitudes toward migration 
and homosexuality are all simultaneously accounted for. We now test possible 
interactions of gender and ideology first, gender and policy-related attitudes secondly, 
on patterns of support for the radical right. This follows our theoretical expectation – 
outlined in the “four-cell” table – whereby political attitudes should differently affect 
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different categories of women and men voters in their levels of RR support, consistent 
with the idea that both a “modern” and a “traditional” gender gap contribute to 
explaining gender-based attitudes toward radical right parties. 
 
*** Figures 5a and 5b here *** 
 
First, is ideology differently moderating RR support across gender? A clearly 
significant interaction coefficient (p=0.008, table not reported) suggests that this is the 
case. Figure 4 presents the estimated marginal effects of left-right self-placement on 
RR support conditional on gender, as drawn from interaction model 3 (see Appendix 
A). As it turns out, levels of support for RR parties differ across gender at the right 
but not at the left of the ideological scale. The average PTV score for RR parties is, 
for instance, 0.69 points lower among women than men voters positioning themselves 
at the extreme right of the scale (position 10), but it does not significantly differ 
across gender within positions 0 to 4 (center-left). Therefore, the effect of gender on 
RR support is moderated by ideology, in that women placing themselves at the radical 
right appear to be less assertive than men in their propensities to vote for radical right 
parties. In our theoretical framework (four-cell table), this stands for a “traditional” 
pattern of RR support, with right-wing women less disposed to support radical right 
parties and more favorable to established conservative parties.  
 
In addition, histograms in Figure 4 provide the actual distribution of left-right self-
placement across gender. This reminds us another fundamental element: in 2014, 
European women lean, on average, more to the left than to the right or, alternatively – 
and consistently with persisting lower assertiveness in politics – prefer to position 
themselves at the center of the ideological spectrum, not choosing between left and 
right. Hence, to correctly understand the relationship between gender, ideology and 
voting, one should keep these three elements in mind: women voters are (1) less often 
on the right than men (modern gender gap);  (2) they are more often on the center 
(lower political assertiveness); (3) when positioned on the right, they are less prone to 
express support for the RR parties (traditional radical right gender gap). While the 
first two elements are compositional in nature, the third points to a moderating effect 
of ideology in predicting gender-based patterns of RR support, with men’s greater 
propensity to vote for these parties having a clearer radical right connotation.   
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We finally test interactions of gender with the two policy-related attitudes that proved 
most strongly associated with RR support, namely migration and same-sex marriage.  
Both figures 5a and 5b show very similar patterns of gender-policies interactions, 
which tend to replicate what we have already observed about left-right ideology. The 
RRGG is highest among voters who are more hostile to policies favoring immigrants 
and homosexuals, whereas it disappears among those with the most tolerant stances 
(positions 7 to 10 for migration, positions 0 to 1 for same-sex marriage) on these 
issues. Once again, not only are men slightly more radical in their positioning with 
respect to these issues (see histograms for positions 0 to 3 in figure 5a, for position 10 
– especially when compared with position 0 – in figure 5b), they are clearly more 
supportive of radical right parties when they take these “tougher” stances. Conversely, 
women who most clearly affirm their tolerance vis-à-vis social outgroups do not 
differ from men in their firm rejection of the radical right (PTV scores close to 0 for 
the migration issue, around 1.6 for the moral issue). Hence, we obtain once again a 
twofold picture in relation to the radical right gender gap: on the one side, 
disappearance of the gender gap in the presence of left-wing and more tolerant 
political positioning (“equal rejection”); on the other side, permanence of the radical 
right gender gap as a result of “traditional support” based on a mix of higher male 
ideological ‘toughness’ and lower women’s political assertiveness.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
A broad picture results from this analysis of voters’ support for six European radical 
right parties. It suggests that, consistent with previous findings in recent decades 
(Betz, 1994; Givens, 2004; Immerzeel et al., 2013), a Radical Right Gender Gap 
(RRGG) exists, with women significantly less likely than men to support RR parties. 
Yet, contrary to conventional wisdom, this gap appears relatively mild (if translated in 
electoral terms, roughly 4-5 percentage points at the most). And given that women 
account for some 53 percent of the electorate in general, one should keep in mind that 
in spite of the RRGG, there are as many if not more women than men in RR 
electorates.  
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Above and beyond the broad picture, however, this paper has first investigated the 
compositional bases of the RRGG and found that this gap does not depend on 
education- and religion-related gender differences between men and women voters; 
secondly, it has identified the fundamental mediators of the RRGP, i.e. ideological 
and political attitudes that logically precede electoral support. In particular, left-right 
self-placement and attitudes toward immigrants and homosexuality have emerged as 
the main factors that mediate between gender and vote, with the gender gap losing all 
significance when they are simultaneously held constant. 
 
Thirdly, and perhaps more importantly, our paper has demonstrated that at least two 
patterns lie behind the general idea of “radical right gender gap”. Indeed, when the 
RRGG is there, it can have two opposite meanings across different intra-gender 
categories of voters. On the one hand, it implies relatively high levels of support for 
radical right parties, but even higher support among men. On the other hand, it 
involves clear rejection of the radical right, but even clearer rejection among women.  
In the first case (“Traditional support”, according to the theoretical framework 
outlined in the four-cell table), the explanation is compositional in ideological terms 
(i.e. women are less often on the right of the ideological spectrum and tend to be more 
tolerant than men vis-à-vis social outgroups), but rests also on a different – i.e. lower 
– women’s propensity to turn right-wing attitudes into explicit support for the radical 
right. In other words, women tend to “agree” less – although, admittedly, only slightly 
less – than men with the ideological and political stances of radical right parties, but 
even when they do agree, they are less willing to support these parties. Hence, and 
consistent with what other researchers have found in relation to the 2009 EP election 
and across a more heterogeneous group of populist radical right parties (Harteveld et 
al., 2015), one may also conclude that political attitudes – namely, political attitudes 
that are less assertive and less “tough” among women – both mediate and moderate 
the relationship between gender and RR voting.  
 
Conversely, in the second pattern (“Modern rejection”) women appear to be at least as 
categorical as men in refusing the radical right. The explanation for this apparent 
paradox – co-presence of “modern” and “traditional” patterns of gender gap – is in 
truth very simple, and rests on the idea of intra-gender heterogeneity, with women 
appearing particularly split along societal and ideological lines (DiMaggio et al., 
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1996; Campbell, 2006; Gidengil, 2007; Barisione, 2014). If we consider the similar 
cases of “modern rejection” and “equal rejection” together, what we are confronted 
with is the ideal type of a younger highly-educated left-wing woman who clearly does 
not lack assertiveness in contrasting the radical right, and who is very far from the 
profile of the woman on which the traditional RRGG rests – i.e. older, less-educated, 
more religious and politically conservative. In addition, a third type of woman, 
characterized essentially by socioeconomic insecurity and exclusion from the labour 
force, tends to assimilate men’s inclination to vote for a radical right party (“Equal 
support”). 
 
Although we have not found cross-country clues for the hypothesis that the erosion of 
the RRGG is associated with a normalization strategy pursued by some RR parties, 
the comparative perspective was admittedly marginal in our research design, whereby 
ensuring inter-party homogeneity was more important than enlarging the number of 
cases. The longitudinal dimension was also missing in this paper, and should be 
incorporated in an enlarged research design including all of the waves of the 
European Election Studies at least since 1989.  
 
As for the dependent variable, we maintain that the PTV (propensities to vote) score 
is particularly suitable to study the structure of attitudes and patterns of behaviors 
toward radical right parties in Europe, given both the often too small number of 
observations referencing actual votes for these parties and the overall reliability, as 
shown in section 2, of these scores as measures of electoral support. A further step 
would be to test our findings on actual voting for the RR, drawing from national 
electoral surveys.    
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Table 1. Parameter estimates (coefficients with standard errors in parentheses) of four 
different mixed-effects multilevel regression models predicting the propensities to 
vote for radical Right parties 
     
 Model 0 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 (Basic) (Societal) (Political) (Policy) 
     
Gender (Man/woman) -0.455*** -0.453*** -0.333*** -0.146 
 (0.12) (0.10) (0.09) (0.11) 
Age  -0.016*** -0.017*** -0.025*** 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Education (1=lower; 3=higher)  -0.741*** -0.598*** -0.425*** 
  (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
Religion (Church attendance 
0=never; 7=weekly) 
 -0.062** -0.103*** -0.120*** 
  (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Voted at EP 2014 (No/yes)   -0.215* -0.121 
   (0.10) (0.09) 
Political Interest (1=low; 4=high)   -0.231*** -0.116** 
   (0.05) (0.04) 
Left-Right ideology (0-10)   0.428*** 0.307*** 
   (0.02) (0.02) 
Immigration (against restrictive 
policy) (0-10) 
   -0.318*** 
    (0.01) 
Oppose same-sex marriage (0-
10) 
   0.106*** 
    (0.01) 
Intercept 2.939*** 5.704*** 3.949*** 5.103*** 
 (0.42) (0.48) (0.46) (0.47) 
     
Random-effect parameters:     
Gender (std. dev.) 0.188 0.145 0.080 0.178 
Gender (std. err.) 0.116 0.124 0.156 0.103 
     
Intercept (std. dev.) 0.983 0.979 0.910 0.949 
Intercept (std. err.) 0.309 0.318 0.302 0.301 
     
     
N 5853 5853 5853 5853 
p 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Log Likelihood -15221.393 -15138.88 -14793.73 -14485.809 
aic 30452.787 30293.761 29609.460 28997.618 
Significance levels: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001 
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Figure 1 
The effect of gender on the propensities to vote (PTVs) for RR parties by country  
 
 
 
Note: each point indicates the relative gender gap (men’s score minus women’s score) on the 
0-10 PTV scale, and corresponds to the estimated coefficient (slope) drawn from four mixed-
effects (random intercept and slopes) multilevel models (basic, societal, political and policy-
related). 
 
Figures 2 and 3 
Marginal effects of Education and Employment on RR support conditional on gender 
(women voters) (with 95% confidence intervals) (see interaction models 1 and 2) 
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Figure 4 
Marginal effects of left-right self-placement on RR support conditional on gender 
(women voters) (with 95% confidence intervals) (see interaction model 3) 
 
 
Figure 5a and 5b 
Marginal effects of attitudes toward migration and homosexuality on RR support 
conditional on gender (women voters) (with 95% confidence intervals) (see 
interaction models 4 and 5) 
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APPENDIX 
 
Appendix A 
 
Interaction model 1 
RRPTVi = β0ij + β1jGENDERi + β2EDUCATIONi + β3 GENDERi*EDUCATIONi 
+ β4AGEi + β5RELIGi + εi 
 
Interaction model 2 
RRPTVi = β0ij + β1jGENDERi + β2EDUCATIONi + β3EMPLOYMENTi + 
β4GENDERi*EMPLOYMENTi + β5AGEi + β6RELIGi + εi 
 
Interaction model 3 
RRPTVi = β0ij + β1jGENDERi + β2EDUCATIONi + β3IDEOLOGYi + 
β4GENDERi*IDEOLOGYi + β5AGEi + β6RELIGi + εi 
 
Interaction model 4 
RRPTVi = β0ij + β1jGENDERi + β2EDUCATIONi + β3IMMIGRANTSi + 
β4GENDERi*IMMIGRANTSi + β5AGEi + β6RELIGi + εi 
 
Interaction model 5 
RRPTVi = β0ij + β1jGENDERi + β2EDUCATIONi + β3HOMOSEXi + 
β4GENDERi*HOMOSEXi + β5AGEi + β6RELIGi + εi 
 
All models, which have the PTV (propensities to vote) score for RR party as the 
dependent variable, are mixed-effects multilevel models with varying intercepts and 
slopes (for gender) for group indicator j (country). 
 
 
Appendix Table 1 
Vote choice for radical right parties in the 2014 EES sample and at 2014 EP election. 
    
Country  Other 
party 
RR 
party 
Total 
 
% EP 
2014 
Denmark N 592 180 772  
26.6 (Danish People’s Party) % 76.68 23.32 100.00 
      
France N 305 58 363  
(National Front) % 84.02 15.98 100.00 24.86 
      
Austria N 436 106 542  
(Austrian Freedom Party) % 80.44 19.56 100.00 19.72 
      
Netherlands  N 638 40 678  
(Party of Freedom) % 94.10 5.90 100.00 13.3 
      
Sweden N 856 53 909  
(Sweden Democrats) % 94.17 5.83 100.00 9.67 
      
Belgium N 451 26 477  
(Flemish Interest) % 94.55 5.45 100.00 4.26 
      
Total N 3,278 463 3,741  
 % 87.62 12.38 100.00  
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Appendix Table 2 
Respondents’ average placement of each Radical Right party on 0-10 left-right scale  
 
 L-R Mean Std. dev. N Min Max 
National Front 8.79 2.38 947 0 10 
Austrian Freedom Party 8.14 2.29 963 0 10 
Flemish Interest 8.03 3.06 550 0 10 
Sweden Democrats 7.78 2.84 959 0 10 
Party of Freedom 7.67 2.79 979 0 10 
Danish People's Party 7.44 2.40 985 0 10 
 
 
 
Appendix Table 3 
Average score on the “propensity to vote” variable for each Radical Right party by 
respondents’ vote choice 
 
Party  
Avg. 
All 
respdts 
Std. 
Dev. 
 
 
N 
Avg. 
RR  
voters 
Std. 
Dev. 
 
 
N 
Avg. 
Other 
voters 
Std. 
Dev. 
 
 
N Danish	  People's	  Party 3.53 3.86 1051 8.48 2.13 180 1.86 2.77 592 National	  Front 2.23 3.48 993 8.26 2.74 58 0.95 2.25 305 Austrian	  Freedom	  Party 3.34 3.56 1025 9.09 1.86 106 1.87 2.42 436 Party	  of	  Freedom 1.55 2.88 1090 8.25 2.63 40 0.65 1.72 638 Sweden	  Democrats 1.17 2.69 1114 8.19 2.90 53 0.58 1.76 856 Flemish	  Interest 1.72 2.79 580 8.77 1.21 26 1.32 2.29 451 
Total 2.28 3.39 5853 8.56 2.27 463 1.13 2.24 3278 
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Appendix Figure 1  
Percentage distribution of 0-10 PTV scores by each RR party and gender 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 For a good introduction to the debate see the special issue of Patterns of prejudice, on 
Gender and populist radical rights politics, especially the opening paper (Spierings, Zaslove, 
Mügge & de Lange, 2015 and in the same issue Mudde, Kaltwasser). 
2 For an interesting approach of the contrasted reaction of women to the use of torture in the 
post 9/11 context, because of the opposed impact of feminism and motherhood, see 
Wemlinger, 2013. 
3 See for instance the comparative analysis conducted at OFCE (Eydoux, Math and Périvier, 
2014) showing how the recession first had an impact on men and then on women, from “he-
cession to she-austerity”.  
4 For a close yet slightly different definition of the  « moderating » and « mediating » effects 
explaining the RRGG also see  Harteveld , van der Brug, Dahlberg and Kokkonen (2015).  
5 We refer in this paper to the definition of the populist radical right parties given by Cas 
Mudde, based on nativism, authoritarianism and populism (Mudde, 2007, p.19). 
6 In the EES 2014 dataset a set of other relevant policy-related variables are available – from 
national sovereignty to public spending, from crime to environmental issues. For the sake of 
parsimony, we decided to focus only on the two issues that emerged from the multivariate 
analysis as the most strongly associated with voting for radical parties.	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